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This paper is an empirical attempt to quantify caste-based discrimination in 
the labor market using household data taken from rural North India. In the regression 
analysis, transaction costs associated with entry into the labor market and reservation 
wages are estimated along with market wages. The estimation results provide evidence 
of the existence of transaction costs in the labor market and discrimination against 
backward classes with regard to access to regular employment. In line with previous 
studies, the results suggest that the achievements of India’s reservation policy so far 
have at best been limited.  In addition, a comparison between the estimates from the 
model employed in this paper and conventional (reduced-form) approaches shows that 
discrimination in labor market entry is likely to be underestimated in the conventional 
reduced-form approaches.   
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1. Introduction 
For rural dwellers in developing countries, off-farm activities are becoming 
more important in determining their welfare. In rural India, where the labor market is 
relatively large, off-farm wage employment plays an important role as a source of 
income (Lanjouw and Shariff, 2004) and as insurance against agricultural risks (Kochar, 
1999; Rose, 2001; Ito and Kurosaki, 2006).   
While there are a number of studies on the labor market in India, only a few 
have investigated the role of labor market discrimination (see, e.g., Banerjee and 
Knight, 1985, on caste-based discrimination and Kingdon and Unni, 2001, on 
gender-based discrimination). The existence of discrimination may inhibit the 
expansion of the labor market which could help to reduce the dependence on agriculture. 
Moreover, the existence of discrimination may distort households' decisions not only 
with regard to labor allocation but also to human capital investment. In the rural 
context, both are issues of great importance. Examining labor market discrimination 
using rural household data therefore can make an important contribution to 
understanding how rural development can be achieved and rural poverty eliminated. 
This paper is an empirical attempt to quantify caste-based discrimination in 
the labor market using household data from rural North India.1 While several social 
reforms aiming to eradicate the caste system have been carried out,2 the economic 
                                                  
1  Castes (the traditional hereditary classes) in India consist of thousands of 
endogamous groups called jatis (the word literally means “birth”). Members of each jati 
are typically and traditionally engaged in the same occupation. Although the Indian 
caste system is originally based on Hinduism, not only Hindus but Muslims and 
members of other religious groups are also subject to it. 
2  One of the most important reforms is a series of policies called “reservation” in order 
to increase the economic opportunities available to members of the socially backward 
classes such as scheduled castes (“untouchables”), scheduled tribes and other backward 
castes. It is a type of affirmative action that reserves posts in educational and social 
institutions for these classes.  3  
circumstances of socially backward and upper castes continue to differ substantially 
(Srinivasan and Kumar, 1999; Borooah, 2005). In the labor market, too, evidence of 
caste discrimination can be found and is reflected in market wages (Banerjee and 
Knight, 1985). However, an important question that has received little research 
attention so far is whether discrimination with regard to entry into the labor market 
exists, and if so, to what extent. 
Several studies that have attempted to estimate discrimination in labor 
market access do exist. Banerjee and Knight (1985), for example, in their examination 
of wage differentials between scheduled and non-scheduled castes in the urban labor 
market based on the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973), sought to distinguish two components: discrimination in wages within the same 
occupation (“wage discrimination”) and discrimination in access to a well-paid job (“job 
discrimination”). They found that “unexplained” components account for a significant 
part of observed wage differentials, and that “wage discrimination” dominated “job 
discrimination.” Using a similar method, Borooah et al. (2005) examined differences in 
employment rates between upper and backward castes. Their results also indicated that 
“job discrimination” against the backward classes explains only part of the observed 
differences. 
However, their analyses on labor market participation are based on a 
reduced-form approach, so that the estimate of “job discrimination” virtually includes 
the effect of “wage discrimination.” The aim of this paper is to address this shortcoming 
by employing a structural model in which the (fixed) transaction costs associated with 
entry into the labor market and reservation wages are estimated along with market  4  
earnings from the observed individuals' labor supply responses.3  If individuals knew all 
particulars about all available jobs, i.e., in the case of perfect information, there would 
be no need to devote time to looking for a suitable job. In reality, however, this is not the 
case. The costs of finding employment depend on an individual’s characteristics and the 
features of the region he or she resides in. Moreover, if employers have discriminatory 
tastes toward certain social classes or utilize social class as supplementary information 
because of limited information on individual characteristics, the costs may differ from 
one class to another. The structural estimation employed in this study enables us to 
more clearly distinguish between discrimination in wages and in labor market entry. 
From a policy-making viewpoint, it is quite important to know whether labor market 
discrimination exists in the form of wage differentiation (“wage discrimination”) or the 
range of jobs available (“job discrimination”) or both. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes 
empirical models to estimate market/reservation wages and transaction costs 
simultaneously. Section 3 describes the dataset. The sample used in the analysis 
consists of working-age males in rural areas of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in North India. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. They provide evidence of the existence of 
transaction costs in the labor market and discrimination against backward classes with 
regard to access to regular employment, but no evidence of discrimination in wages from 
regular employment activities is found. Furthermore, a comparison between the 
                                                  
3  For the studies on transaction costs associated with entry into the market, see, for 
instance, Cogan (1981) on married women’s labor supply in the U.S., and Sadoulet et al. 
(1998) and Key et al. (2000) on corn producers’ supply responses to labor and product 
markets in Mexico. These studies found that transaction costs matter for workers’ or 
households’ decisions on market involvement. In addition, Jacoby (1993) found evidence 
for the existence of transaction costs in the labor market in an analysis of farmers’ labor 
supply in Peru, while Skoufias (1994) obtained a similar result with a sample of Indian 
rural households.  5  
estimates from the structural model and the conventional (reduced-form) approaches 
shows that discrimination in labor market entry is likely to be underestimated when 
one employs the latter. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical specification 
Market labor can be broadly classified in terms of employment status into two 
types: casual and regular employment. In what follows, it is assumed that while there is 
no cost of entry into the casual labor market, transaction costs are involved in finding 
regular employment.4 Transaction costs in the labor market represent fixed costs 
associated with labor market entry, such as actual expenditure and/or time spent 
traveling for finding employment. With transaction costs in monetary terms 
represented by  C , the probabilities of being regularly employed and of being casually 
employed can respectively be expressed as follows: 
() ( )
R
r c r r W C W W C W I > − > − = = , Pr 1 Pr  
( )
R
r c r W K W W K W ln ln ln , ln ln ln Pr > − > − = , 
() ( )
R
c r c c W W C W W I > − > = = , Pr 1 Pr  
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R
c r c W W K W W ln ln , ln ln ln Pr > − > = , 
where  k I   is an indicator variable that takes one if the individual is employed in a type 
k  job (k =r : regular, c : casual),  k W  is the wage earned in the job, 
R W  is the 
                                                  
4  In general, specific skills or knowledge are not necessarily required in casual wage 
labor because this, for the most part, consists of physical labor. In addition, most casual 
laborers work within their villages, while regular workers often work in neighboring 
cities (outside the village). For these reasons, transaction costs are likely to be negligible 
and constant. Thus, the assumption not only simplifies the empirical model but is also 
plausible in the present context.  6  
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The functions of market wages in each type of employment, (relative) 
transaction costs, and reservation wages are respectively specified as 
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where  X ,  K Z , and  R Z   are matrices of variables affecting market wages, transaction 
costs, and reservation wages;  β  and γ   are vectors of coefficients to be estimated; and 
e and u   are zero mean random error terms. Note that market wages can be observed 
only for market laborers; thus, we can only use the density  ( ) k k I W f | ln  when 1 = k I . 
By applying Bayes’ rule, () ( ) ( )( ) 1 Pr / ln ln | 1 Pr 1 | ln = = = = k k k k k k I W f W I I W f , and from 
standard conditional distribution results for joint normal random variables, we get the 
following equation: 
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and elements in the variance-covariance matrix of the conditional distribution of ε  
                                                  
5  As mentioned in the following section, the majority of rural workers in developing 
countries are engaged in self-employed farming and it is not necessarily assumed in our 
model that leisure is the sole alternative to wage labor. Thus, the term “reservation 
wage” is used in the broad sense that it determines whether the worker is engaged in 
wage work or not (including self-employment).  7  
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where  ) (⋅ E ,  ) (⋅ Cov , and  ) (⋅ V   represent operators taking the mathematical 
expectation, the covariance, and the variance of their arguments, respectively. Further, 
the probability of being a non-participant ( 1 = n I ) is   
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where  () ⋅ φ  is the (univariate) standard normal density function. Note that  K ln  and  8  
R W ln are estimated as latent variables in our model and hence one may think 
identification problems arise when estimating parameters  K γ  ( R γ ) separately from 
R γ  ( K γ ) and k β  ( . ,c r k = ). However, due to the assumption that there are no 
transaction costs involved in finding casual employment, but such costs are present in 
finding regular employment, identification of  K γ and  R γ  are guaranteed in turn by 
k β , which can be estimated consistently from the density ( ) k W f ln   in the log likelihood 
function. Therefore, parameters (β  and γ ) can be consistently estimated as long as 
the explanatory variables are orthogonal to the error terms.6 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Sample and key features 
The data employed in this paper are from the Survey of Living Conditions, 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which is one of the Living Standard Measurement Study 
(LSMS) surveys conducted in developing countries. Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar are 
located in the Ganges Plain of North India and are known for their high poverty 
incidence. The survey was conducted in 1997/98, covering 1,035 households, 57 villages, 
and 13 districts in Bihar and 1,215 households, 63 villages, and 12 districts in UP. The 
sample used in the analysis comprises male household members aged between 15 and 
60 and consist of 3,324 individuals.7 
 
                                                  
6  Furthermore, even in the case that all elements in X ,  K Z  and  R Z  are  identical, 
that is, there is no exclusion restriction on parameters, identification of  β  and γ  
remains guaranteed. 
7  To focus on labor market participation, students (351), disabled people (35) and 
members with missing information on work activities and/or other characteristics (227) 
were excluded from the sample.  9  
[Table 1] 
 
Information on work activities and wages is available for each household 
member from January 1997 to December 1997. Market wages are reported by 
employment status: regular (salaried) or casual employment. Table 1 shows summary 
statistics for labor market participation and monthly earnings of working-age males by 
caste. Monthly earnings from regular employment activities in addition to the base 
salary include other payments such as bonuses, while monthly earnings from casual 
employment activities are the average earnings in working months.   
Obviously, the composition of the employment status and average monthly 
earnings differ from caste to caste. Individuals belonging to middle and backward castes 
are less likely to be in regular employment and more likely to be casually employed 
than those belonging to the upper or Muslim upper castes. Especially, among the 
scheduled castes, more than half of all male workers are casually employed. In addition, 
the average earnings of upper caste members are more than thirty percent higher than 
those of members of the other caste classes in both wage activities. 
On the other hand, there are also large differences in the average schooling 
years between castes. As can be seen in Table 1, there is a negative correlation between 
the average years of education and the proportion of casual workers. Given that most 
casual workers are engaged in agricultural wage work, this may reflect the lack of 
response of agricultural wages to human capital (Kurosaki and Khan, 2006) and the 
stigma associated with working as an agricultural laborer in rural India. In the 
regression analysis, it is examined whether the differences in employment status and 
wage differentials between castes are mainly attributable to human capital  10 
characteristics or other factors, namely caste-based discrimination. 
3.2 Empirical variables 
The empirical variables used in the regression analysis are summarized in 
Tables 2 and 3. The first four rows provide information on market earnings (Log 
earnings-regular, Log earnings-casual) and employment status (Regular emp. dummy 
and  Casual emp. dummy). Out of the 2,000 individuals in the sample who did not 
participate in the labor market, 1,105 (55 percent) were engaged in agricultural 
self-employed work, 694 (35 percent) in non-agricultural self-employed work, and 201 
(10 percent) in domestic work or were not working. Thus, strictly speaking, the 
“reservation wage” to be estimated using this dataset mainly reflects the marginal 






Human capital characteristics affecting market earnings, transaction costs and 
reservation wages include educational attainment, job experience, and age. Actual job 
experience is not available from the dataset and is therefore measured using the 
following formula: age minus years of education minus 6 years (experience).9 Age, of 
course, reflects not only job experience but also human capital accumulation over an 
individual’s lifetime; however, to concentrate on the effect of human capital 
                                                  
8  In this connection, because information on incomes from self-employment activities is 
not available, the production functions for those activities cannot be estimated directly. 
9  There are 11 cases (less than 0.4 percent of the sample) in which experience becomes a 
negative value (the minimum is -3), and these are replaced by zero.  11 
accumulation after formal schooling, the variable experience  is employed in the 
earnings equation. The effects of education and experience on market earnings are 
expected to be positive but are likely to depend on the employment status. The impact of 
education on the cost of entry is expected to be negative, while that of age is expected to 
be positive. The effect on the reservation wage is expected to be positive both in the case 
of education and age. 
To control for the different roles of household members, other individual-level 
characteristics are taken into account by employing dummy variables for household 
heads and firstborn sons (HH head and Firstborn son) as well as the number of elder 
brothers (No. of elder brothers). Because these variables are likely to have no effects on 
market earnings and transaction costs, they are included only in the reservation wage 
function. Being the household head or the firstborn son of the household head may 
magnify the economic responsibilities of the person in the household, while having 
many elder brothers is likely to have the opposite effect. Thus, the expected signs are 
positive for HH head and Firstborn son, but negative for No. elder brothers.  
Household level characteristics are family structure, farming assets, and caste 
membership. Variables for household structure are the number of working age and non- 
working age members (No. of working age members and No. of non-working age 
members). The number of working age (non-working age) members mainly captures the 
working (dependent) population in the household and the expected impact on 
reservation wages is negative (positive). On the other hand, the impact of these 
variables on market earnings and transaction costs is somewhat ambiguous. If 
household members’ nutritional status is negatively correlated with household size, the 
effects of these variables on market earnings are expected to be negative and those on  12 
transaction costs are positive. 
As farming assets, the size of farmland owned by households (Land size), the 
share of farmland that is irrigated (Irrigation ratio), and the value of semi-fixed capital 
in agricultural production (Agr. capital) and livestock (Livestock) are employed.10 These 
variables mainly capture household members’ productivity in own-farm activities and  
the impact of these variables on reservation wages are therefore expected to be positive. 
Turning to the impact on market earnings and transaction costs, since household 
members’ nutritional status is likely to be correlated with farming assets, they are 
likely to have a positive effect on market earnings and a negative one on transaction 
costs. 
Caste dummies (with the upper caste as the reference group) capture 
“unexplained” differences between castes in market earnings, transaction costs and 
reservation wages. Although the inclusion of caste dummies in the reservation wage 
function may appear dubious, it seems in fact only natural to assume that workers 
belonging to a caste that has traditionally suffered from discrimination in the labor 
market have a negative attitude or low expectations with regard to finding a job. This 
being the case, the reservation wage of those belonging to an economically 
disadvantaged class is low in comparison with those belonging to an advantaged class. 
Table 1 suggests that the impact of belonging to one of the backward classes is negative 
on market earnings and positive on transaction costs. Therefore, a negative effect is 
expected on reservation wages. 
 As regional characteristics, the ratio of the landless within the village (Ratio 
                                                  
10  Given that the “reservation wage” mainly captures the marginal productivity in 
agricultural/non-agricultural self-employed activities, variables affecting the 
productivity in non-farm enterprise production should be added. Unfortunately, data 
that would allow us to control for productivity in these activities are not available.    13 
of landless), the average distance to the nearest bank, police station and secondary 
school (Distance to facilities), and a UP state dummy are employed. The Ratio of 
landless is a proxy for the number of potential workers, and its impact on market 
earnings is expected to be negative, although that on transaction costs and reservation 
wages is ambiguous. The Distance to facilities captures proximity to the nearest city 
and hence the degree of economic development of the village. It is expected that in 
villages far from an urban area, market earnings and reservation wages are low and the 
costs of finding regular employment are high. In addition to these variables, the ratio of 
workers in regular employment, a proxy for information exchange about jobs among 
villagers, is used only in the transaction cost function and is likely to lower transaction 
costs. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
Before embarking on the empirical investigation, some limitations of the 
analysis should be mentioned. First, several household level variables to control for 
family structure and farming assets are excluded from the market earnings and 
transaction cost equations because of a convergence problem. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that the estimates suffer from omitted variables bias. For instance, in casual 
employment activities, workers’ nutritional status, which may be captured by these 
variables, is an important determinant of market wages in the Indian labor market 
(Deolalikar, 1988; Weinberger, 2003). In addition, it is possible that the estimated effect 
of human capital on market wages are biased (Heckman and Hotz, 1986; Kingdon, 
1998). Unfortunately, the model that includes these variables in all functions failed to 
achieve a convergence of the likelihood function, but the effects of these variables on  14 
market wages and transaction costs are likely to be negligible.   
A second limitation is that there is also a possibility of bias due to other omitted 
variables. If individuals’ schooling choices are determined by their ability (or the 
possibility of getting a job), this may cause schooling effects to be biased (i.e., there 
would be “ability bias”) and the exclusion of students from the sample would make the 
problem worse. To examine this possibility, estimations using limited samples –   
including only those aged between 18 and 60, and including only those aged between 20 
and 60 – were conducted. The coefficients were slightly different from the estimates 
using the full sample, but there were no systematic differences.11 This suggests that 
there is no “ability bias” or, if there is, it is rather small. 
Table 4 shows the estimation result of the log-likelihood function (4). As can be 
seen, the coefficient on most of the explanatory variables takes the expected sign. The 
null hypothesis of no transaction costs is tested by using a likelihood ratio test. The 
2 χ  
statistic of 189.75 (p-value is 0.00) indicates rejection of the hypothesis. 
4.1 Analysis of the market wage functions 
Estimation results for the market wage functions are presented in the first and 
second columns of Table 4. The effect of human capital on the market wage differs 
sharply depending on the employment status. While the return to education is positive 
in the case of regular employment, it shows an inverted U-shape in the case of casual 
employment, indicating that marginal returns to education become negative at more 
than eight years of education. The impact of job experience peaks at 44 years for regular 
employment and at 20 years for casual employment. The fact that human capital does 
not contribute much toward improving productivity in casual employment activities 
                                                  
11  These results are available on request.  15 
may reflect the fact that the majority of casual workers are hired for unskilled, manual 
labor, such as agricultural work.   
Looking at caste membership, the coefficients on caste dummies are negative 
in all cases in the casual labor wage functions and negative in most cases in the regular 
labor wage function. In casual employment activities, membership of an 
agriculture-based backward or scheduled caste significantly decreases wages.12 This 
result is consistent with the findings from Table 1. The monthly earnings from casual 
employment activities for the agriculture-based backward castes are 33.5 percent 
( 1
289 . 0 − ≈ e , 68 percent of the total wage differentials) lower than those for the upper 
castes, and those for the scheduled castes are 37.4 percent (67 percent) lower. 
However, one should guard against any hasty interpretation of this result as 
evidence of wage discrimination in the casual labor market. In our analysis, workers’ 
occupations are simply classified into two types (casual and regular employment), hence 
the diversity of occupations within the same status is ignored. An alternative 
interpretation, therefore, is that the socially backward classes are traditionally occupied 
in low-paying casual employment activities, so that the results possibly reflect 
occupational segregation rather than wage discrimination. Unfortunately, because of 
data limitations, it is impossible to investigate this issue further by disaggregating the 
sample by occupation or industry. 
 
 [Table  4] 
 
                                                  
12  The result also shows that membership of a middle caste has a significant negative 
effect on wages from regular employment activities. But this result should be treated 
with caution because the sample contains only eight middle caste workers engaged in 
this type of job.    16 
4.2 Analysis of the transaction cost and reservation wage functions 
Estimation results of the transaction cost and reservation wage functions are 
presented in the third and forth columns of Table 4. Schooling years have a negative 
effect on transaction costs and a positive effect on reservation wages when evaluated at 
the sample mean (4.84 years), but the effect of Schooling years on transaction costs and 
the effect of Schooling years squared in both estimates is insignificant. Age has a 
significant positive effect on transaction costs but no significant effect on reservation 
wages.  
Turning to caste dummies, individuals belonging to groups characterized as 
backward face significantly higher transaction costs than those belonging to the upper 
castes.13 The results indicate that membership of one of the four backward classes 
increases transaction costs by 39 percent (backward-agr.) to 79 percent (scheduled), 
which may suggest discrimination in labor market entry. 
However, the results obtained here should be interpreted with care. For 
instance, it is possible that caste membership captures the effects of caste networks 
(Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005). If members of the upper castes are traditionally 
employed in regular employment activities and hiring through referrals is prevalent, 
then the negative effect of backward-caste membership may simply reflect the lack of 
such network referrals. There is another possible explanation as well. As already 
mentioned, workers belonging to groups that have traditionally experienced 
discrimination may hold low expectations of gaining a job. In this case, even in the 
                                                  
13  To investigate the robustness of the impact of caste membership on transaction costs, 
an alternative specification is tested in which caste dummies are excluded from the 
market earnings and reservation wage equations. This results shows that the 
coefficients of dummies for the lower castes (except for the Muslim backward dummy) 
are positive and significant in the transaction cost equation. The results are available 
from the author on request.  17 
absence of discrimination by employers based on their (or other employees’) tastes or 
beliefs, these workers may not look as hard for a job as members of other castes. The 
higher transaction costs for members of socially backward castes may result from such 
self-fulfilling beliefs. However, even in these circumstances, there is no doubt that 
government policies to combat inequality in employment opportunities have not been 
successful in the study region. Our results show that members of socially backward 
castes indeed face greater difficulties in finding regular employment than members of 
the upper castes.   
In the reservation wage function, on the other hand, all dummies have 
negative coefficients. This is consistent with the story mentioned in the previous section. 
However, this result may simply reflect the low marginal productivities in the 
self-employment activities that members of the socially backward castes are engaged in 
because they face discrimination even in these activities.   
The effects of the other control variables are as expected. Among regional 
characteristics, the ratio of salaried workers in the same village significantly decreases 
the cost of entry. This indicates the importance of social networks in finding regular 
employment. 
4.4 Effects of human capital and caste membership on participation 
Thus far, the discussion has concentrated on the impact of the explanatory on 
the dependent variables. This subsection focuses on the impact of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of gaining regular employment. The marginal effects of 
human capital and caste membership on regular labor market participation, holding all 
other variables constant at their sample mean, are shown in the first column of Table 5. 
Furthermore, the effects are decomposed into three parts: those through market  18 
earnings (in the second column), those through transaction costs (in the third column), 




The table indicates that an additional year of education increases the 
probability of being in regular employment by approximately 1.0 percentage points 
when evaluated at the sample mean of schooling years (4.84 years). The breakdown of 
the effect of schooling on the probability of being in regular employment into its 
components shows that it is largely through the effect on market earnings.   
The effect of caste membership through transaction costs lowers the likelihood 
of members of backward castes to be in regular employment by 6.5 percentage points 
(68 percent of the total difference in the employment rate) in the case of other backward 
castes, by 3.3 percentage points (32 percent) in the case of scheduled castes, and by 3.0 
percentage points (39 percent) in the case of agriculture-based backward castes. 
However, these negative effects through transaction costs are to a great extent 
attenuated through earnings and reservation wages. This result implies that an 
analysis of the role of discrimination in labor market entry based on a reduced form 
approach is likely to underestimate the impact of discrimination. In fact, this is 
confirmed by the probit estimation (in the fifth column) and the estimation using the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition procedure (in the sixth column). The comparison of the 
predicted mean probability and of the percent correctly predicted between our model 
and the probit model shows that our model predicts the labor participation decision 
equally as well as the probit model. Thus, when one employs a reduced form model, the  19 
possibility of this underestimation should be recognized. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examined caste discrimination in the labor market by estimating 
simultaneously market earnings, reservation wages, and the costs of finding regular 
employment. The estimation results suggest that socially backward castes do face 
disadvantages in finding regular employment in the sense that they face higher 
transaction costs associated with entry into the labor market. On the other hand, there 
is no evidence for wage discrimination in regular employment activities. Thus, these 
results suggested that caste-based discrimination takes the form of “job discrimination,” 
which limits the range of available jobs, rather than “wage discrimination,”14 However, 
this is at odds with Banerjee and Knight’s (1985) findings, which indicated that “wage 
discrimination” explained a large part of the “unexplained” component of wage 
differentials. Although one should be careful about directly comparing their results with 
ours because the data they used was of 1,115 migrant laborers in Delhi in 1975-76, it 
should at least be noted that it is possibility that their analysis underestimated the role 
of “job discrimination.” This paper has shown that the reservation wages of the socially 
backward castes are lower than those of the upper castes and consequently estimates of 
“job discrimination” in a reduced-form approach may capture not only discrimination in 
entry but also such self-selection effects.   
Furthermore, it was found that the large differences in educational attainment 
between castes represent one important cause of inequality in employment status. Thus, 
                                                  
14  Similarly, studies on racial discrimination in the U. S. also found that discrimination 
typically takes the form of market segregation rather than price differentiation (see, e.g., 
Arrow, 1998).    20 
as India’s reservation policy has aimed to do, promoting opportunities in education and 
employment for socially backward castes can be an instrument in eliminating 
inequality in economic conditions between castes. At the same time, however, the 
results obtained here suggest that the reservation policy so far has had little effect on 
rural dwellers in the study region, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, although it is not clear 
whether this is the results of some fundamental problems with this policy or reflects the 
specific circumstances of these two states, which are among the least developed in India. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed assessment of the policy, 
the fact that backward castes continue to be disadvantaged half a century after it was 
introduced suggests that its achievements have at best been limited. 
Finally, several limitations of this paper should be mentioned. One possible 
problem is associated with the validity of the assumption introduced in the estimation 
model that transaction costs in the casual labor market are constant. As mentioned 
earlier, this assumption seems plausible in the context of rural India, and the 
comparison of results between our model and the probit model suggest that our model is 
valid. However, it is impossible to test the sensitivity of the model to the assumption 
since it is an essential assumption for parameter identification. But the most important 
limitation of this paper probably is that there is a possibility that estimated caste 
differences in market wages and participation probabilities capture other omitted 
differences between castes rather than discrimination. Although this appears to be a 
common problem in studies on labor market discrimination, the occupational 
classification in this paper (i.e., casual or regular employment) may exacerbate the 
problem. Essentially, wage rates and individual responses may vary not simply by 
employment status but by sector or type of occupation, but such occupational diversity  21 
within the same employment status was ignored in our analysis. Consequently, 
estimated caste differences may to some extent reflect the effects of occupational 
segregation. Given that India’s caste system is based on hereditary occupations, future 
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Note: (1) Employment status is based on workers’ primary job classified based on their 
annual working days. Note that approximately 20 percent of workers were also engaged 
in secondary activities. 
(2) The caste category in this table follows the classification of the Survey of Living 
Conditions, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Note that this does not necessarily correspond to 
the classification of the “reservation policy.” For instance, “backward-other” in the table 
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A. Individual level variable 
Log earnings-regular 
Log earnings-casual 
Regular emp. dummy 






HH head dummy 
Firstborn son dummy 
 
No. of elder brothers 
B. Household level variables 
No. of working age members 
No. of non-working age 
members 
Land size (10acres) 
Irrigation ratio 
 









Ratio of landless 
Distance to facilities (Km) 
 
Ratio of salaried workers (%) 
 
 






Log of monthly earnings paid to a regular worker 
Log of average monthly earnings paid to a casual laborer 
Dummy variable for those mainly in regular employment 
Dummy variable for those mainly in casual employment 
Standardized years of completed education corresponding 
to the standard education system in India 
Age minus standardized years of completed education 
minus 6 years 
Age of the person 
Dummy variable for the household head 
Dummy variable for the firstborn son of the household 
head 
Number of elder brothers (incl. brothers-in-law) 
 
Number of household members aged between 15 and 60 
Number of household members other than working-age 
members 
Land owned by the household 
Ratio of irrigated land to total land size owned by the 
household 
Value of fixed agricultural capital owned by the household 
Value of livestock owned by the household 
Dummy variable for middle castes 
Dummy variable for agriculture-based backward castes 
Dummy variable for other backward castes 
Dummy variable for scheduled castes 
Dummy variable for upper Muslim castes 
Dummy variable for backward Muslim castes 
 
Ratio of the landless in the village 
Average distance to the nearest bank, police station, and 
secondary school from the village 
Ratio of village-total workers in regular employment 
(other than household members) to village-total 
working-age people 





































































































































Table 3: Summary statistics of variables 
Name 
A. Individual level variables 
Log earnings-regular 
  (in  Rupees) 
Log earnings-casual 
  (in  Rupees) 
Regular emp. dummy 




HH head dummy 
Firstborn son dummy 
No. of elder brothers 
 
B. Household level variables 
No. of working age members 
No. of non-working age members 
Land size (10acres) 
Irrigation ratio 










Ratio of landless 
Distance to facilities (Km) 
Ratio of salaried workers (%) 
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HH head dummy 
Firstborn son dummy 
No. of elder brothers 
Household characteristics 
No. of working age members 













Ratio of landless 
Distance to facilities/10 
Ratio of salaried workers 
























-0.026(0.25)   
-0.026(0.22)   
0.000(0.00)   
-0.124(0.73)   
0.143(0.83)   
 
-0.374(2.00)† 
-0.066(0.53)   
- 























 -0.812(1.44)  
-0.289(1.77)* 
-0.263(1.49)   
-0.469(2.17)† 
-0.124(0.48)   
-0.276(1.38)   
 
-0.119(0.98)   








-0.044(1.45)   




















0.007(0.02)   
0.440(1.69)* 
 
-0.175(0.78)   









-0.301(1.54)   
- 
- 
0.003(0.21)   
-0.005(0.31)   
-0.020(0.53)   
-0.051(1.16)   
0.000(0.02)   
 
0.008(0.70)   
-0.004(0.81)   
0.054(0.79)   
0.147(1.66)* 
 0.032(2.13)† 
0.045(1.17)   
 




-0.272(1.19)   
-0.388(2.08)† 
 
-0.214(1.63)   
0.004(0.05)   
- 
0.045(0.67)   
6.562(14.4)‡ 
0.678(13.0)‡ 
Note: (1) Numbers in parentheses are z-values based on clustering robust standard 
errors using households as clusters. 
(2) * Significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ‡ significant at 1%. 
(3) NOB = 3324; log-likelihood = -3887.19.  0 H : zero slope, LR
2 χ (62) = 1223.70; 0 H : no 
transaction costs, LR
2 χ (17) = 189.75. 



























0.010   
0.019   
 
-0.049   
-0.013   
-0.038   
-0.021   







 0.009  
0.152   
 
0.013   
0.010   
0.017   
0.007   
-0.009   






0.004   
-0.135   
 
 -0.074  
-0.030   
-0.065   
-0.033   
-0.003   






-0.004   
0.001   
 
0.012   
0.007   
0.011   
0.005   
0.026   







0.010   
0.026   
 
-0.042   
-0.006   
-0.028   
-0.014   










-0.054   
-0.019   
-0.032   
-0.022   
0.054   
0.014   
 
Note: (1) Calculated figures in the table are the average marginal effect of each variable 
on the probability of being in regular employment. Note that in the case of binary 
variables, calculated figures are the average change in response probabilities when the 
variable changes from 0 to 1, and in general the whole effect does not equal the sum of 
(a), (b) and (c) because of the calculation method. For ease of comparison, however, it is 
adjusted in such a way that the sum equals the whole effect.   
(2) The marginal effects through “Market earnings” are the sum of marginal effects 
through monthly earnings from regular and from casual employment activities. 
(3) The dependent variable for the probit estimation presented in the fifth column is an 
indicator variable that takes one if a worker is engaged in a regular employment 
activity and zero otherwise (see Table A-1). While the predicted mean probability with 
the probit model (Table A-1) is 0.1164, that with our procedure (Table 3) is 0.1162 (the 
sample mean is 0.1164). In addition, the percentage of observations being correctly 
predicted with regard to the employment status (using the 50 percent rule) is 0.885 for 
the probit model and 0.884 for our model. Thus, our model appears to predict the labor 
participation decision equally as well as the probit model. 
(4) In the calculation of the effects of schooling years and age, those through job 
experience are taken into account using the following relation between them: 
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Appendix 1: Probit estimation of the probability of being in regular employment 
 
 
Table A-1: Estimation result   
 
Dependent variable:   




Schooling years squared/100 
Age 
Age squared/100 
HH head dummy 
Firstborn son dummy 
No. of elder brothers 
Household characteristics 
No. of working age members 













Ratio of landless 
Distance to facilities/10 
Ratio of salaried workers 








































































Note: (1) See Table 4, Notes (1) and (2). 
 (2) NOB=3324; log-likelihood = -1064.56, pseudo 
2 R = 0.110.  0 H : zero slope, LR 
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Appendix 2: Estimation of “job discrimination” à la Banerjee and Knight (1985) 
  The estimation procedure explained below is an application of the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method for the trichotomous occupational choice model 
(multinomial logit model). The probability that an individual  i  belonging to the  g th 
social group ( : R g =  reference group,  : C  comparison group) will be a regular 
























= Ρ  , 
where  X  is a vector of variables affecting the labor participation decision and k β  is a 
vector of coefficients corresponding to the  k th type of employment activity (r : regular 
employment,  c : casual employment, n : not employed). Let 
C
r i,
~ Ρ  be the probability 
that an individual belonging to a comparison group (C ) will be a regular employee if he 




























. The difference between the two 
groups in the probability of being regularly employed is decomposed as follows: 












r Ρ − Ρ + Ρ − Ρ = Ρ − Ρ ~ ~
 . 
The first component in this equation measures the “unexplained” difference due to 
differences in coefficients, while the second measures the “explained” difference due to 
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Note: (1) The reference group is the upper caste with a sample size of 506 individuals. 